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CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM 
JONATHAN H. ADLER† 
Major environmental policy reform is long overdue. The current 
regulatory architecture was erected in the 1970s. Since then 
meaningful reforms have been few and far between. A few reforms 
and regulatory expansions were adopted in the 1980s,1 and Congress 
enacted significant reforms to the Clean Air Act in 1990.2 Only the 
most minor environmental bills have been enacted since then.3 
In 1996, Richard Stewart observed that conventional 
environmental regulation was a “failing paradigm.”4 At the same 
time, analysts at Resources for the Future concluded that America’s 
environmental regulatory system was “deeply and fundamentally 
flawed.”5 Other contemporaneous reviews of federal environmental 
regulation reached similar conclusions.6 Yet, little has happened. 
 
        †      Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business 
Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Senior Fellow, Property & 
Environment Research Center. This article is based on remarks delivered at the conference on 
“Conservative Visions of Our Environmental Future” at Duke Law School, September 24, 2012. 
The author thanks Audrey Balint for her research assistance. 
 1. For example, in 1986 Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
 2. See Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 501–507, 104 Stat. 2399, 2635–48 (1990). 
 3. The most notable pieces of environmental legislation in the past twenty years were the 
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996), the Food 
Quality Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, §§ 101–305, 501, 110 Stat. 1489, 1489–1513, 1536–38 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), and the Small Business Liability 
Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002). None of 
these reforms made significant changes to the nation’s primary pollution control or conservation 
statutes. 
 4.  See Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 
15 J.L. & COM. 585, 585–91 (1996); see also Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks 
Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1988) (“[T]he system has 
grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style central 
planning of the economy to achieve environmental goals.”). 
 5.  J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION 2 (1997) (“For all 
its accomplishments, we conclude that the pollution control regulatory system is deeply and 
fundamentally flawed.”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Karl Hausker, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Only Path to a 
Sustainable Future, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10148 (1999) (“The current system, consisting mainly of 
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Despite these and other calls for reform, the environmental 
regulatory system remains largely the same as it did some twenty 
years ago.7 
The nation’s environmental regulatory architecture may not have 
changed significantly over the past few decades, but the range of 
environmental problems has. Regulatory measures designed to 
address the industrial pollution of the twentieth century are poorly 
suited to address the more complex and difficult challenges of the 
twenty-first. 
There is an urgent need to debate the future of environmental 
protection in this country. If the debate is to be productive, it needs to 
span the political spectrum. Therein lies a problem: It is unclear 
whether many on the political right are prepared to engage in serious 
policy discussion about the future of environmental policy. While 
there is no shortage of complaints about centralized government 
regulation, few are willing to suggest alternatives. Those on the 
political right have largely failed to engage in meaningful discussion 
about how the nation’s environmental goals may be best achieved.8 
Perhaps as a consequence, the general premises underlying existing 
environmental laws have gone unchallenged and few meaningful 
reforms have been proposed, let alone adopted. 
This Essay seeks to outline the foundation of a conservative 
alternative to the conventional environmental paradigm.9 After 
 
end-of-pipe, technology-based regulations, is inadequate for the challenges ahead . . . .”); Debra 
S. Knopman & Marc K. Landy, A New Model of Governance, BLUEPRINT, Fall 2000, at 34 
(observing that existing environmental regulations were becoming “increasingly inefficient in a 
fast-paced economy and too rigid”); see also Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, 
Reinventing the EPA to Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1998) (“Where it does exist, popular frustration with environmental laws focuses 
on a perceived unfairness and cost inefficiency built into the existing system.”); THINKING 
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2 (Marian R. Chertow 
& Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (acknowledging that the environmental regulations of the past will 
be inadequate to combat current and future environmental problems). 
 7.  See Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for 
the New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (“For almost 20 years, 
political polarization and a lack of leadership have left environmental protection in the United 
States burdened with obsolescent statutes and regulatory strategies.”). 
 8.  Insofar as those who could be identified as on the “right” have engaged in 
environmental policy debates, this participation has been largely confined to academics and 
think-tank analysts. 
 9.  For the purposes of this article, “conservative” is defined to include both libertarian 
and traditionalist conservative viewpoints, as both were core elements of the post-World War II 
American conservative movement, particularly with regard to domestic policy. See generally 
GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 
(3d ed. 2006). In its current form, the conservative movement represents a fusion of a classical 
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surveying contemporary conservative approaches to environmental 
policies, this Essay briefly sketches some problems with the 
conventional environmental paradigm, particularly its emphasis on 
prescriptive regulation and the centralization of regulatory authority 
in the hands of the federal government. The Essay then concludes 
with a summary of several environmental principles that could 
provide the basis for a conservative alternative to conventional 
environmental policies. 
I. A MISSING VISION 
Is there a conservative vision of environmental policy? It is a 
good question. For quite some time, there have been two dominant 
responses from the political right to the expression of environmental 
concern: One is a moderate “me-too”-ism, the other is a reflexive 
opposition.10 The first acknowledges the importance of environmental 
concerns and endorses whatever environmental goals are on the table 
but calls for policies that can achieve these goals at less expense. The 
“me-too” moderate does not challenge prevailing environmentalist 
priorities nor question the need for more regulation. For the “me-
too” moderate, the only problem with environmental protection is 
that it costs too much, and it is perhaps not subject to a sufficiently 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis. 
Moderate “me-too”-ism is pragmatic to a fault and seeks to 
achieve the same goals for a little bit less, even if it takes a little bit 
longer. This approach is necessarily unsatisfactory and anything but 
inspiring. President George H.W. Bush adopted this approach, 
promising to be the “environmental president” and supporting the 
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act,11 yet environmentalist 
 
liberal view of individual liberty and limited government with a commitment to traditional 
morality. See, e.g., Peter Berkowitz, Constitutional Conservatism, 153 POL’Y REV. 3, 5 (2009) 
(describing post-war conservative “fusion”); see also FRANK S. MEYER, IN DEFENSE OF 
FREEDOM: A CONSERVATIVE CREDO 4–7 (1962) (providing an influential articulation on this 
fusion). 
 10.  For a broader survey of conservative environmental thought, see Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., Conservative Environmental Thought: The Bush Administration and 
Environmental Policy, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 312–23 (2005). Most of the strains Thompson  
identifies are more evident among academics and think-tank analysts than among conservative 
elected officials, policymakers, or political pundits. 
 11. Richard L. Berke, Oratory of Environmentalism Becomes the Sound of Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/17/us/oratory-of-environmentalism-
becomes-the-sound-of-politics.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (noting environmentalist 
critiques of Bush despite his support for 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments). 
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leaders still supported his opponent in 1992.12 If environmental 
protection is that important, it does not make much sense to nickel-
and-dime environmental efforts. Why would anyone endorse a 
watered-down imitation of ecological concern in place of the real 
thing? And insofar as existing regulatory institutions are outdated or 
ill-conceived, more moderate implementation hardly promises 
greater degrees of environmental protection, let alone an inspiring 
vision for environmental reform. Insofar as much federal 
environmental regulation is outdated, outmoded, or (despite the best 
of intentions) ill-conceived, there is little to be gained from trying to 
implement it on the cheap. 
The dominant alternative on the political right has been 
reflexive— almost reactionary—opposition to anything green. Quite 
simply, whatever the Sierra Club or Al Gore supports must be 
opposed. Environmental policies are suspect because they threaten 
industrial activity and growth, and environmental concern may even 
be a stalking horse for a more sinister ideology.13 In recent years, this 
approach has become increasingly prevalent within conservative 
circles—to the point that opposition to environmental regulation has 
become a litmus test in some quarters.14 This reactionary posture has 
expanded beyond reflexive opposition to environmental policy 
proposals to encompass a reflexive denial that environmental 
problems, of whatever sort, actually exist. For instance, some 
 
 12. See Scott Bronstein, The Environment: Is Clinton Cleaner, Greener than Bush? 
Arkansas Group Balks as Sierrans Back Governor, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 2, 1992, at A8 
(noting the Sierra Club’s endorsement of Bill Clinton over George Bush despite the former’s 
mixed environmental record as Governor of Arkansas). 
 13. The late conservative columnist Warren T. Brookes described as “watermelons” those 
environmentalists who were “dark green on the outside, red on the inside.” Shawn Macomber, 
The Man Who Saw Tomorrow, AM. SPECTATOR (July 13, 2007), 
http://spectator.org/archives/2007/07/13/the-man-who-saw-tomorrow. There is also a cottage 
industry proclaiming that environmentalism masks a radical agenda that will harm the nation. 
See, e.g., JAMES INHOFE, THE GREATEST HOAX: HOW THE GLOBAL WARMING CONSPIRACY 
THREATENS YOUR FUTURE (2012); ELIZABETH NICKSON, ECO-FASCISTS: HOW RADICAL 
CONSERVATIONISTS ARE DESTROYING OUR HERITAGE (2012); BRIAN SUSSMAN: ECO-
TYRANNY: HOW THE LEFT’S GREEN AGENDA WILL DISMANTLE AMERICA (2012); ROBERT 
ZUBRIN, MERCHANTS OF DESPAIR: RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISTS, CRIMINAL PSEUDO-
SCIENTISTS, AND THE FATAL CULT OF ANTIHUMANISM (2012). 
 14.  See, e.g., Jim Tankersley, Climate Change Skepticism a Litmus Test for GOP, CHI. 
TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-03-07/news/ct-nw-climate-politics-
20100305_1_climate-change-united-nations-intergovernmental-panel-climate-science; Andrew 
C. Revkin, Still Searching for Republicans With Climate Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2012), 
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/still-searching-for-republicans-with-climate-
concerns/; see also Thompson, supra note 10, at 309–10 (noting that Republican politicians have 
become increasingly hostile to environmental measures). 
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conservative commentators and activists condemned New Jersey 
Governor Chris Christie, a Republican, for commenting that he 
believes global climate change is a serious concern, even though his 
comments came as he vetoed environmental legislation opposed by 
conservatives.15 It was not enough that Governor Christie rejected a 
controversial regional greenhouse gas initiative, for he had committed 
the heresy of acknowledging a belief in climate change.16 For some on 
the right, ideological opposition to greenhouse gas regulation has 
spawned a litmus test for scientific belief. It is certainly true that some 
environmental problems are exaggerated, if not illusory, and that 
environmental activists have a history of hyping false alarms.17 Yet 
 
 15.  See Christopher Baxter, Gov. Christie Admits Climate Change Is a Real Problem, that 
Human Activity Plays a Role, NJ.COM, (Aug. 19, 2011, 7:46 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/ 
index.ssf/2011/08/gov_christie_admits_climate_ch.html. A copy of Gov. Christie’s statement is 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/62679739/Governor-Christie-Vetoes-S-2946. 
 16.  See, e.g., Doug Powers, Chris Christie: Climate Change is Real, Humans Contribute, 
MICHELLEMALKIN.COM (Aug. 20, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://michellemalkin.com/2011/08/20/chris-
christie-climate-change-is-real-humans-contribute/; Kevin Mooney, Is Gov. Chris Christie of 
N.J. Now a Global Warming Alarmist?, NETRIGHTDAILY (May 31, 2011), 
http://netrightdaily.com/2011/05/is-gov-chris-christie-of-n-j-now-a-global-warming-alarmist/. 
 17.  The most notable recent critique of contemporary environmental alarmism is BJØRN 
LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE 
WORLD (2001). For a discussion of Lomborg’s critique, see Symposium on Bjørn Lomborg’s 
The Skeptical Environmentalist, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 249 (2002). Lomborg was not the first 
writer to document the exaggeration of environmental threats. See, e.g., EARTH REPORT 2000: 
REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANT (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000); WILFRED 
BECKERMAN, THROUGH GREEN-COLORED GLASSES: ENVIRONMENTALISM RECONSIDERED 
13–24 (1996) (arguing that appeals by “environmental pressure groups” have become larger in 
scope and more melodramatic since the 1970s); GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT UPON THE 
EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM XVI (1995) (“[O]ur political and 
cultural institutions continue to read from a script of instant doomsday.”); THE STATE OF 
HUMANITY (Julian Simon ed., 1995); THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 5 (Ronald Bailey ed., 
1995) (“There has been a growing gap between the mounting scientific evidence about the 
actual status of various environmental problems and the often bleaker views promoted by 
environmental activists.”); AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES (1995); RONALD BAILEY, ECO-SCAM: THE 
FALSE PROPHETS OF ECOLOGICAL DOOM (1993); THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH: A RESPONSE 
TO GLOBAL 2000 (Julian L. Simon & Herman Kahn eds., 1984). Nor was Lomborg the last. See, 
e.g., SILENT SPRING AT 50: THE FALSE CRISES OF RACHEL CARSON 255–70 (Roger Meiners, 
Pierre Desroches & Andrew Morriss eds., 2012) (noting some environmental groups’ attempts 
to fan public fear for environmental issues even when evidence of harm has not been 
established); INDUR M. GOKLANY, THE IMPROVING STATE OF THE WORLD: WHY WE’RE 
LIVING LONGER, HEALTHIER, MORE COMFORTABLE LIVES ON A CLEANER PLANET (2007); 
JACK M. HOLLANDER, THE REAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: WHY POVERTY, NOT 
AFFLUENCE, IS THE ENVIRONMENT’S NUMBER ONE ENEMY 1–11 (2003) (noting the growth of 
“environmental pessimism” over the last half century); GLOBAL WARMING AND OTHER ECO-
MYTHS: HOW THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT USES FALSE SCIENCE TO SCARE US TO 
DEATH (Ronald Bailey ed., 2002). 
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environmental problems are real18 and Americans demand high levels 
of environmental protection.19 
While there is no shortage of opposition to environmentalist 
policies on the political right, there is little evidence of a conservative 
environmental program. What has been lacking on the political right 
has been any concerted effort to challenge the dominant 
environmental paradigm and, in particular, the conventional view that 
the existence of environmental problems is a justification for 
increased government intervention in the economy. Both moderate 
“me-too”-ism and reflexive opposition accept the fundamental 
premise that prescriptive environmental regulation—and federal 
environmental regulation in particular—is a necessary response to the 
existence of environmental problems, but seek to resist the 
implications. For the former, this means just trimming ten percent off 
the top. For the latter, it means opposition across the board. Both 
sides implicitly accept the corollary that support for expanding the 
scope and severity of environmental regulation is a measure of one’s 
commitment to environmental protection. As a consequence, 
environmental protection is seen, almost exclusively, as a cause of the 
“Left,” and those who care about environmental protection are 
inexorably drawn toward a progressive policy agenda.20 This state of 
affairs is not sustainable. It will not lead to the adoption of sound 
environmental policies. 
II. CHALLENGING THE DOMINANT ENVIRONMENTAL PARADIGM 
The conventional environmental paradigm must be challenged. 
There is no reason to assume that environmental problems, even big 
 
 18.  Even so-called skeptics recognize the existence of environmental problems. See, e.g., 
Michael DeAlessi, Fishing for Solutions: The State of the World’s Fisheries, in EARTH REPORT 
2000, supra note 17, at 85; David Riggs, Avoiding Water Wars, in GLOBAL WARMING AND 
OTHER ECO-MYTHS, supra note 17, at 219. 
 19.  See, e.g., Noelle Straub, Gallup Poll Finds Most Americans Supporting Enviro 
Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/04/22/22greenwire-
gallup-poll-finds-most-americans-supporting-en-19618.html. 
 20.  See Straub, supra note 19 (noting “increased political polarization” of environmental 
issues). Another contributing factor to this phenomenon is the tendency of environmental 
activist organizations to ally themselves with progressive interest groups and Democratic Party 
constituencies and the apparent partisanship of some groups, such as the League of 
Conservation Voters. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Sorry Green Giant, NAT’L REV. ONLINE 
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/248284/sorry-green-giant-jonathan-h-
adler; JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISM IN 
AMERICA 24–26 (1995). 
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environmental problems, necessarily call for big government.21 Nor 
does the existence of environmental concerns necessarily justify 
extending federal authority over local and regional concerns.22 To the 
contrary, there are many reasons to question the modern 
environmental movement’s excessive reliance on centralized 
government authority as its ecological savior and to ask whether 
political institutions are likely to encourage sound ecological 
stewardship or environmental sustainability. 
A. Revisiting the Tragedy of the Commons 
The problems with the existing environmental paradigm are not 
limited to romanticizing the federal role in environmental protection. 
The way we think about environmental concerns is also heavily 
influenced by Garrett Hardin’s seminal 1968 essay on “The Tragedy 
of the Commons.”23 In this essay, Hardin described the fate of a 
common pasture, unowned and available to all.24 In such a situation it 
is in each herder’s self-interest to maximize his use of the commons at 
the expense of the community at large.25 Each herder captures all of 
the benefit from adding one more animal to his herd.26 Yet the costs 
of overgrazing the pasture are distributed among every user of the 
pasture.27 When all of the herders respond to these incentives, the 
pasture is overgrazed—hence the tragedy.28 As Hardin explained it, 
the pursuit of self-interest in an open-access commons leads to ruin.29 
Without controls on access and use of the underlying resource, the 
tragedy of the commons is inevitable.  
 
 21. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental 
Protection, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 661–76 (2001). 
 22. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 
NYU ENVTL. L. J. 130 (2005) (discussing the incongruity of the current jurisdictional regime and 
arguing for limiting federal efforts to those areas where federal involvement is institutionally 
advantageous); Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur 
Environmental Innovation, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 263 (J. Chen ed., 2003) 
(arguing for decentralization as a reform measure). 
 23.  See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 24.  Id. at 1244. It should be noted that what Hardin called the “commons” is more 
properly described as an open-access commons, as there are some resources that are owned or 
managed in common that do not suffer the tragedy because they are subject to community 
management of some form or another, but the central point stands. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29. As Hardin noted, “freedom in the commons brings ruin to all.” Id. at 1244. 
Adler (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2013  10:41 PM 
260 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIII:253 
Hardin’s essay was tremendously important, not because he 
discovered the commons problem—others had documented this 
dynamic before30—but because he popularized a useful way of 
thinking about many environmental problems. The metaphor of the 
commons can be applied to virtually any environmental resource. 
Instead of a pasture one could talk of a herd of animals, a fishery, a 
lake, or even an airshed. When a common, open-access resource is 
used as a pollution sink, the same underlying dynamic can be 
observed.31 In each case, if access and use are not limited in some 
fashion, overuse is inevitable as demand grows. 
Hardin’s diagnosis is often identified as a rationale for 
prescriptive regulation—what Hardin famously termed as “mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon.”32 This was his way of describing 
regulations or other restrictions imposed to prevent a resource from 
befalling the fate of an open-access commons. Paired with 
conventional economic analysis that calls for governmental 
intervention to correct for any unaccounted-for environmental effect 
of economic activity—so-called “externalities”—Hardin’s account 
seemed to justify pervasive environmental regulation.33 We have 
 
 30.  The commons problem with regard to ocean fisheries was identified several years 
earlier. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The 
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole 
Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116 (1955). The general phenomenon was identified much earlier 
however. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS § 1261.b32, at 108 (c. 384 B.C.E.) (Trevor J. 
Saunders ed., T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Classics rev. ed. 1981). 
 31.  See Hardin, supra note 23, at 1245 (“In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons 
reappears in problems of pollution.”). 
 32.  Id. at 1247. 
 33.  It is generally argued that the existence of an unaccounted-for environmental effect 
necessarily justifies government intervention to correct for the existence of the so-called 
“externality.” This too is a presumption that should be challenged. For instance, Nobel laureate 
economist Ronald H. Coase, whose work on social costs has been very influential in 
environmental law and economics, argued that the mere existence of “externalities” does not 
demonstrate the need for government intervention. As Coase explained: 
[T]he existence of “externalities” does not imply that there is a prima facie case for 
government intervention, if by this statement is meant that, when we find 
“externalities,” there is a presumption that governmental intervention (taxation or 
regulation) is called for rather than the other courses of action which could be taken 
(including inaction, the abandonment of earlier governmental action, or the facilitating 
of market transactions) . . . The fact that governmental intervention also has its costs 
makes it very likely that most “externalities” should be allowed to continue if the value 
of production is to be maximized . . . The ubiquitous nature of “externalities” suggests 
to me that there is a prima facie case against intervention. 
R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 1, 
26 (1988); see also James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 
ECONOMICA 371, 380–84 (1962) (noting that externalities are only relevant in a limited set of 
circumstances). 
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largely followed this path in environmental policy for the past fifty 
years. 
Administrative regulations have produced some gains, but also 
many failings. Our air and water are cleaner today than forty years 
ago—and substantially so—but many ecological resources are still 
threatened.34 Many of the environmental goals embraced in the 1970s 
proved to be aspirational as federal environmental regulation failed 
to produce the degree of environmental protection for which many 
had hoped.35 In some cases, environmental regulations have actually 
begun to get in the way of further progress. For example, the 
imposition of land-use controls under the Endangered Species Act 
can discourage effective conservation on private land and undermine 
research efforts.36 Hazardous waste classifications can discourage 
recycling of waste streams, and the liability regime imposed under the 
federal Superfund law has discouraged quick and cost-effective 
hazardous waste cleanup.37 
One thing that Hardin overlooked is that the political process 
often replicates the same economic dynamic that encourages the 
tragedy of the commons—a dynamic fostered by the ability to capture 
concentrated benefits while dispersing the costs.38 Like the herder 
 
 34.  In the case of water quality, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency 
reports that among assessed waters, over one-half of rivers and streams (measured by stream 
miles) and over two-thirds of lakes, reservoirs, and ponds (measured by acreage) are “impaired” 
or “threatened.” See Watershed Assessment, Tracking & Environmental Results, National 
Summary of State Information, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://ofmpub.epa.gov/waters10/ 
attains_nation_cy.control (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). Thus even those who celebrate the Clean 
Water Act’s achievements acknowledge that “the glass is only half full.” See James Salzman, 
Why Rivers No Longer Burn, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
health_and_science/science/2012/12/clean_water_act_40th_anniversary_the_greatest_success_in
_environmental_law.html. 
 35.  The Clean Water Act of 1972, for example, had a stated goal of eliminating the 
discharge of pollutants into the nation’s waters by 1985. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2006). See 
also Richard J. Lazarus, Greening of America and the Graying of United States Environmental 
Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 75, 78 (2001) (describing much of the 1970s federal environmental laws as 
“remarkably aspirational in scope and in their mandates”). 
 36.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences 
of Uncompensated Land-Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REV. 301 (2008). 
 37.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Reforming Our Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policies, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 724, 737 (2008); Jonathan H. Adler, The Hazards of Regulating Hazardous Waste, 
16 REG. 13. (1993), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg16n2g.html. 
 38.  See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (arguing that interest groups produce public 
goods—available to all members regardless of their contribution—and the general public bears 
the cost of producing these goods because group members have no incentive to do so). 
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who has an incentive to put out yet one more animal to graze, each 
interest group has every incentive to seek special benefits through the 
political process, while dispersing the costs of providing those benefits 
to the public at large.39 Just as no herder has adequate incentive to 
withhold more animals from grazing, no interest group has adequate 
incentive to forego its turn to obtain concentrated benefits at public 
expense. In the political process, the common welfare is, in all 
practical respects, a “public good.”40 As a consequence, the logic of 
collective action discourages investments in sound public policy, just 
as it discourages investments in sound ecological stewardship. This 
logic, in addition to the pervasiveness of special interest rent-seeking, 
helps explain many of the failings of centralized regulation.41 So 
despite the environmental gains of the past half-century, real 
challenges remain, and the tragedy of the commons is still with us. 
Administrative regulation has been the dominant tool in 
environmental policy over the past half-century, but it was not the 
only prescription Hardin offered. What many forget is Hardin 
actually offered two prescriptions for preventing the tragedy of the 
commons. “Mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” was one 
approach, but Hardin had another.42 In the alternative, Hardin 
suggested that greater reliance on property rights was a proven way 
to prevent the tragedy of the commons.43 As he explained, the tragedy 
of the commons “is averted by private property, or something 
formally like it.”44 Indeed, Hardin suggested this was one of the 
primary functions of property in land.45  
As Hardin recognized, where property rights are well-defined 
and secure, the tragedy of the commons is less likely since each owner 
has ample incentive to act as a steward, caring for the underlying 
resource and preventing its overuse—benefiting both themselves and 
 
 39.  As a general rule, “the driving force behind the formation of an interest group is the 
belief that its members have common interests and goals.” DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE III 473 (2003). 
 40.  See id. (noting that the achievement of a group’s common goals is a public good). 
 41. On the pervasiveness of special interest rent-seeking in environmental policy, see 
generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve 
& Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992); Jonathan H. Adler, Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 1 (Terry L. Anderson 
ed., 2000); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political 
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999). 
 42. Hardin, supra note 23, at 1247. 
 43. Id. at 1245. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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others who may value the underlying resource. In this way, the 
institution of property rights “deters us from exhausting the positive 
resources of the earth.”46 
Hardin was not altogether sanguine about the potential for 
property rights to avert the tragedy of the commons in many areas, 
however. He feared it would be too difficult to define and defend 
such rights in threatened ecological resources, particularly against the 
threat of pollution.47 It is one thing to post and fence private land; it is 
quite another to demarcate property rights in air or water. Yet there 
is far greater potential here than is commonly realized. Enhanced 
technologies and greater understanding of ecological conditions make 
it possible to conceive of property rights today where once they were 
the stuff of ecological fantasy.48 Even if it is impossible to apply 
Hardin’s property prescription to all environmental resources, there 
are many areas in which property-based management regimes are at 
least as plausible as centralized regulatory regimes. 
B. The Fable of Federal Environmental Protection 
Even where government regulation to address environmental 
concerns is warranted, this does not necessarily justify federal 
intervention. Much conventional environmental policy proceeds upon 
the largely unquestioned assumption that the federal government is in 
the best position to address environmental concerns and advance 
environmental values. This premise, which is generally assumed in 
environmental policy debates, is unjustified.49 While the federal 
government has a role to play in environmental protection, the 
virtues of federal intervention have been oversold. 
The traditional account for why the federal government plays a 
dominant role in environmental protection is based upon a false 
narrative—a fable of environmental protection—that has led to the 
over-centralization of environmental protection at the same time as 
the federal government has abdicated its most important 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice 
Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 128–29 
(2001) (explaining how changes in technology can facilitate the definition and enforcement of 
property rights); see generally THE TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (Terry L. Anderson & 
Peter J. Hill eds., 2001) (same). 
 49.  See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005) (arguing that the current division of authority undermines 
environmental protection). 
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environmental responsibilities.50 According to the standard fable, 
post-World War II environmental conditions got inexorably worse 
until the nation’s environmental consciousness awoke in the 1960s 
and demanded action.51 State and local governments were 
environmental laggards and only the federal government was capable 
of safeguarding ecological concerns.52 Events such as the 1969 fire on 
the Cuyahoga River, memorialized in Time magazine with a famous 
picture of a fire tug fighting a river engulfed in flames, are pointed to 
as support for this traditional account.53 This fire, which helped spur 
passage of the 1972 Clean Water Act (CWA), was frequently cited as 
evidence of how bad things were before the federal government got 
involved.54 
Yet the standard fable is just that: a fable—a fictionalized 
account with some truth, but fiction nonetheless. The history of the 
famed 1969 Cuyahoga River fire is instructive.55 There was a fire on 
the Cuyahoga River in June 1969; Time magazine did run a photo of a 
fire on the Cuyahoga; the story of the fire did help spur passage of the 
CWA. That’s where the truth of the standard fable ends. The fire was 
actually a minor event in Cleveland,56 largely because river fires on 
the Cuyahoga had once been common,57 as they had been on 
industrialized rivers throughout the United States in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.58 But river fires were costly 
and posed serious risks to people and property, prompting local 
governments and private industry to act.59 The fire was not evidence 
of how bad things could get, but a reminder of how bad things had 
been. 
 
 50.  See generally Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: 
Reconsidering the Federal Role in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93 
(2004). 
 51.  Id. at 101. 
 52.  Id. at 96. 
 53.  America’s Sewage System and the Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41. 
 54.  Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental 
Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 89–93, 136–38 (2002). 
 55.  See id. (providing a comprehensive account of the Cuyahoga River fire); see also David 
Stradling & Richard Stradling, Perceptions of the Burning River: Deindustrialization and 
Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River, 13 ENVTL. HIST. 515 (2008). 
 56. See Adler, supra note 54, at 96–98. 
 57.  Id. at 99. 
 58.  Id. at 104–05. 
 59. Id. at 106–07. 
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Further, the June 1969 fire was far smaller and less significant 
than the fires of years past.60 Earlier fires had caused substantial 
damage and put lives at risk.61 The 1969 fire, by comparison, was a 
footnote. The fire burned for less than thirty minutes and was out 
before the cameras arrived.62 The picture in Time magazine was not of 
the 1969 fire but of a fire from 1952.63 Apparently, the editors 
of Time felt the need to dramatize their story of environmental ruin 
with a picture of a real fire, so they used the best picture they could 
find, even if it was not of the fire featured in their story. 
The problems with the standard fable extend beyond the story of 
one river. While there were plenty of serious environmental problems 
in the 1960s, it is wrong to suggest everything was getting inexorably 
worse until the federal government got involved. Just as the problem 
of river fires had gotten better, not worse, prior to the 1969 Cuyahoga 
River fire, many environmental indicators were improving before the 
enactment of the major federal environmental laws. According to the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) first national water 
quality inventory in 1972, levels of some key pollutants had been 
declining significantly in the decade prior to enactment of the CWA.64 
Ambient concentrations of some air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide, 
had declined substantially before enactment of the federal Clean Air 
Act.65 Wetland loss rates plummeted, and numerous states adopted 
their own wetland protection programs, well before the CWA was 
interpreted to apply to wetlands.66 And so on. Not every trend was 
positive, to be sure, but many were. In particular, those 
environmental concerns that were most obvious, understandable, and 
costly were improving—largely due to a combination of state, local, 
 
 60.  Id. at 95. 
 61.  Id. at 101–03. 
 62.  Id. at 96–97. 
 63. Id. at 98. 
 64.  See A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 114 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) (“The results of the EPA’s 
first National Water Quality Inventory, conducted in 1973, indicated there had been significant 
improvements in most major waterways over the preceding decade, at least in regard to organic 
wastes and bacteria.”). 
 65.  See ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 19 (1983); see also INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING 
THE AIR 137 (1999); PAUL R. PORTNEY, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 27, 50–51 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990). 
 66.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 
41–54 (1999). 
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and private efforts—whereas emerging or less understood problems 
were not.67 In some cases, federal regulation augmented and 
enhanced these preexisting efforts.68 In other areas, however, it 
imposed redundant or excessive controls that crowded out more 
locally tailored efforts.69 
The actual history of federal environmental regulation challenges 
the notion that increased federal regulation was always necessary to 
enhance environmental protection and that environmental priorities 
are best set in Washington, D.C. This does not mean that all federal 
environmental regulation was unnecessary or unwise. There are some 
environmental problems that state and local governments are 
unwilling or unable to address on their own. But, contrary to the 
standard fable, federal environmental regulation was not always 
necessary or an improvement over the available alternatives. And yet, 
the standard fable still motivates much environmental regulation. 
III. PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM 
Conservatives need not accept the conventional assumptions that 
government regulation, and federal environmental regulation in 
particular, is the best approach to environmental protection. With this 
in mind, I offer five principles to guide conservative efforts at 
environmental reform.70 
A. First, Do No Harm 
Numerous government policies and programs cause, subsidize, or 
encourage the very environmental harms that environmental 
programs are designed to address.71 Federal public works programs, 
such as those implemented by the Bureau of Reclamation and Army 
Corps of Engineers, have left a path of environmental degradation in 
 
 67.  See GOKLANY, supra note 65, at 111–25 (discussing states’ roles). 
 68.  Enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 (aka the 
“Clean Water Act”) accelerated the cleanup of some waterways by, among other things, 
imposing more stringent limits on industrial dischargers and providing increased funding for 
state efforts.  See generally Freeman, supra note 64. 
 69.  See generally Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd: The Impact of Federal Action 
on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 67 (2007) (discussing how federal 
regulation may crowd out state or local efforts). 
 70.  These principles were previously articulated in Adler, supra note 21, at 676–94. 
 71.  See, e.g., DAVID MALIN ROODMAN, WORLDWATCH INST., PAYING THE PIPER: 
SUBSIDIES, POLITICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1996); see also GOVERNMENT VERSUS 
ENVIRONMENT (Donald Leal ed., 2002) (collecting case studies of government programs that 
undermine environmental protection). 
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their wake.72 By some estimates, nearly one-third of the loss of 
forested wetlands in the lower Mississippi Valley can be attributed to 
federal flood control projects.73 Various programs subsidize polluting 
industries, encourage wasteful resource use, and drive unnecessary 
development across the nation’s landscape. Many private activities 
that cause or contribute to environmental harm are encouraged by 
governmental policies. An environmental Hippocratic Oath of “first, 
do no harm” would serve the conservative goal of shrinking 
government while reducing environmental harms at the same time. 
Agricultural subsidies are a prime example. While some 
agricultural programs seek to encourage conservation, farm subsidies 
have encouraged the destruction of wetlands and species habitat, 
increased chemical use, and dramatically altered the American 
landscape.74 Federal mandates for ethanol use have encouraged the 
farming of lands that would otherwise lie fallow or revert to habitat.75 
While some portions of the federal government impose 
regulations to control the environmental consequences of fossil fuels, 
other programs encourage their use. Federal subsidies for renewable 
energy sources may attract more attention, but subsidies for fossil 
fuels remain significant. This includes substantial subsidies for 
research and development—subsidies that would otherwise be borne 
 
 72.  See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS 
DISAPPEARING WATER (1986). See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The 
Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1167 (1999) (noting threats to 
biodiversity posed by water projects). 
 73.  See PAUL F. SCODARI, ENVTL. L. INST., MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL 
WETLANDS PROGRAMS 16 (1997) (citing Robert N. Stavins & Adam B. Jaffe, Unintended 
Impacts of Public Investments on Private Decisions: The Depletion of Forested Wetlands, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 337, 349 (1990)). 
 74.  See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000); Thompson, supra note 72, at 1166 (“[G]overnmental intervention in 
agriculture historically has presented one of the greatest threats to biodiversity.”). 
 75.  See, e.g., REBECCA BROOKE ET AL., NAT’L WILDLIFE FED., CORN ETHANOL AND 
WILDLIFE: HOW INCREASES IN CORN PLANTINGS ARE AFFECTING HABITAT AND WILDLIFE 
IN THE PRAIRIE POTHOLE REGION (2009), available at http://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/ 
Wildlife/01-13-10-Corn-Ethanol-Wildlife.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130312T1953249674. Habitat loss is 
not the only environmental harm from ethanol subsidies. See, e.g., Erica Gies, As Ethanol 
Booms, Critics Warn Environmental Effect, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/business/energy-environment/25iht-rbogeth.html? 
pagewanted=all (noting that each gallon of ethanol may require several hundred gallons of 
water to irrigate the corn grown to produce ethanol); Lester Brown & Jonathan Lewis, 
Ethanol’s Failed Promise, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/21/AR2008042102555.html (documenting other harms from ethanol 
subsidies). 
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by the private sector. In 2012, for example, federal subsidies for fossil 
fuel research and development exceeded $1.4 billion.76 
Government spending programs are not the only sources of 
environmental degradation that come at taxpayer expense. The 
federal government is a notoriously poor steward of federal lands, 
whether one considers lands maintained by the military77 or even 
National Parks.78 Federal facilities and operations are responsible for 
substantial environmental contamination for which, in all likelihood, 
taxpayers will end up holding the tab.79 
Government regulations can also be the source of unnecessary 
environmental harm, either by encouraging environmentally 
destructive conduct or penalizing private actions that could have a 
positive effect. Environmental regulations are no exception. For 
example, the EPA’s 2013 renewable volume requirements for bio-
diesel will, by the agency’s own account, actually produce a net 
increase in air pollution and cannot be otherwise justified on cost-
 
 76.  See TAD DEHAVEN, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS: CORPORATE WELFARE IN THE 
FEDERAL BUDGET 1, 3–5 tbl.1(2012). 
 77. See Bruce Watson, Cleaning Up the Toxic Legacy of Closed Military Bases, 
DAILYFINANCE (Sept. 24, 2010) (noting that “Military base closures can leave behind a toxic 
environmental legacy that’s damaging and expensive to repair. In fact, the U.S. Air Force and 
Navy both rank among the top 100 polluters in America, and many of the bases they’ve left 
behind as a result of the BRAC closures have been declared Superfund sites by the 
Environmental Protection Agency.”), available at http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/09/24/ 
closed-military-bases-leave-a-toxic-legacy/. 
 78. See Holly Lippke Fretwell, Public Land Management, PROPERTY & ENV’T RESEARCH 
CTR. (2004), http://perc.org/articles/2004-index-leading-environmental-indicators-ninth-edition 
(noting that despite the “wealth of resources [provided for National Parks], there are serious 
infrastructure and environmental problems. There are billions of dollars in maintenance 
backlogs, sewage contamination in Yellowstone, and 90 to 200 million acres of federal land at 
high risk of catastrophic fire.”); see also HOLLY LIPPKE FRETWELL, WHO IS MINDING THE 
FEDERAL ESTATE? POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS (2009); KARL 
HESS, ROCKY TIMES AT ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK (1993). 
 79.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-380, SUPERFUND: EPA’S 
ESTIMATED COSTS TO REMEDIATE EXISTING SITES EXCEED CURRENT FUNDING LEVELS, 
AND MORE SITES ARE EXPECTED TO BE ADDED TO THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST 1, 19 
(2010) (finding annual cleanup costs for hazardous waste sites may reach nearly $700 million 
and only 1/7 of the sites on the EPA’s priority list are federal facilities). 
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benefit grounds.80 This is just the latest example of the EPA adopting 
renewable fuel standards that could cause net environmental harm.81 
Targeting government programs that subsidize environmental 
harm is an obvious starting point for conservative environmental 
reforms. Conservatives regularly call for constraining the growth of 
government. Conservative politicians have proposed substantial cuts 
in federal spending, particularly on domestic policy matters, and have 
made reducing the federal debt a dominant policy concern. Thus 
limiting federal spending that subsidizes or supports environmentally 
harmful activities would be an obvious principle for conservatives to 
embrace. Identifying and targeting those governmental interventions 
that produce net environmental harm can enhance environmental 
protection while shrinking the size of the state at the same time. 
B. Green through Growth 
Conservatives should not only seek to constrain government 
programs that cause or increase environmental harm, but they should 
also seek to harness competitive markets and economic growth for 
the environmental benefits they can provide. Economic growth is 
essential to environmental protection. Market-driven competition not 
only spurs such growth, it also creates tremendous incentives for 
more efficient resource use and technological innovation. 
As a general rule, increases in societal wealth correlate with 
increases in the demand for environmental quality and in the means 
to protect environmental concerns.82 As people get wealthier, they 
 
 80.  See Sophie E. Miller, When Environmental Quality Isn’t the Goal: New EPA Fuel 
Standards Foul the Air, REGULATORY STUDIES CTR.: GEORGE WASH. UNIV., (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://research.columbian.gwu.edu/regulatorystudies/sites/default/files/u41/EPA_RFS_2013.pdf 
(commenting on Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2013 Biomass-Based Diesel 
Renewable Fuel, 40 C.F.R. § 80 (2013)). 
 81.  See Am. Petr. Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding “arbitrary and 
capricious” an EPA rule mandating greater ethanol use that EPA acknowledged could worsen 
air quality). For even earlier history, see Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 19 (Michael S. Greve & Fred 
L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992). 
 82.  See RICHARD L. STROUP, ECO-NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13–14 (2003); Jason Scott Johnston, On the Market for 
Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 146 (2002) (“There is abundant evidence that the 
demand for outdoor recreation and environmental amenities increases with national income.”); 
Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from 
Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1997) (noting that most 
environmental goods are normal goods for which demand rises with income); Kenneth E. 
McConnell, Income and the Demand for Environmental Quality, 2 ENV’T. & DEV. ECON. 383, 
385–86 (1997) (reporting on empirical evidence on environmental Kuznets curve); Seth W. 
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have greater levels of disposable income to devote to environmental 
concerns. Surveys find that support for environmental measures, both 
public and private, correlates with changes in personal income.83 Thus, 
it is no surprise that donors to, and members of, environmentalist 
groups are predominantly drawn from upper-income groups.84 There 
is also evidence that wealthier communities are more likely to support 
measures to preserve natural resources and are more willing to forego 
development for environmental reasons.85 
Economic growth also fuels technological advances, such as the 
development of less resource-intensive technologies. At the same 
time, wealth accumulation provides for the resources necessary to 
deploy advanced technologies that help meet human needs more 
efficiently and with less environmental impact.86 
In a competitive economy, businesses face constant pressure to 
economize on resource use to reduce costs. This, too, can feed 
environmentally beneficial innovation. Market-oriented economies 
generally experience more efficient resource use.87 In the 
telecommunications industry, for example, copper wire was gradually 
replaced by fiber optics (made from sand), which was in turn 
supplanted by wireless technologies.88 Each of these steps was the 
result of competitive market-driven innovation, but each produced 
tremendous environmental benefits as well.89 
 
Norton, Property Rights, the Environment, and Economic Well-Being, in WHO OWNS THE 
ENVIRONMENT? 45 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998) (noting that, insofar as 
environmental quality is viewed as a “good,” consumption of environmental quality will 
increase as wealth increases). 
 83.  See, e.g., Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introduction: The Toxic Liability 
Problem: Why Is It Too Large?, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: TOXIC POLLUTANTS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE LAW 1, 15 (Richard L. Stroup ed., 2003). 
 84.  See id. (discussing 1992 reader survey for Sierra magazine finding that members of the 
Sierra Club have an average household income more than double the U.S. average). 
 85.  See Matthew J. Kotchen & Shawn M. Powers, Explaining the Appearance and Success 
of Voter Referenda for Open-Space Conservation, 52 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 373, 388 (2006). 
 86.  See, e.g., GOKLANY, supra note 65, at 5 (“[T]he wealthier the society, the more it can 
afford to research, develop, and install the technologies necessary for a cleaner environment.”); 
see also AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (1988) (providing extensive arguments 
and evidence showing that increasing societal wealth produces environmental and safety 
benefits). 
 87.  See Lynn Scarlett, Doing More with Less: Dematerialization—Unsung Environmental 
Triumph?, in EARTH REPORT 41, 45 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000) (explaining that competitive 
markets push companies to “do more with less”). 
 88.  Id. at 51. 
 89.  See id. 
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C. Promote and Protect Private Property 
The protection of private property has long been a core 
conservative value. Property rights provide the foundation for a 
market economy and hold a central place in the nation’s 
constitutional design.90 The nation’s founders saw the protection of 
private property as among the central aims of government.91 
Private property also played a central role in the early American 
conservation movement. The nation’s first conservation groups were 
formed around the turn of the last century by organized hunters, 
outdoorsmen, and others to protect private land for present and 
future generations.92 The National Committee of Audubon Societies, 
for example, the forerunner to today’s National Audubon Society, 
emphasized the importance of private stewardship in its early efforts 
to protect game birds.93 Where such efforts were not enough, 
Audubon began to purchase land itself to ensure that vital nesting 
and breeding grounds would be protected.94 For early 
conservationists, private property was an essential means of 
protecting precious natural resources and undeveloped lands, 
particularly where there was little political will to enact government 
protections. Conservation pioneers such as Rosalie Edge and William 
Hornaday utilized private ownership as a means to protect threatened 
 
 90.  The Bill of Rights and Reconstruction Amendments explicitly enshrined the 
protection of property into the Constitution. As amended, the Constitution bars government 
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property” without “due process of law” in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. CONST., amends. V & XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). The Fifth 
Amendment further protected private property from being “taken for public use without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST., amend. V. Although “property” is not mentioned in the 
Constitution itself, other than in its amendments, Alexander Hamilton observed at the outset of 
The Federalist Papers that adoption of the Constitution would provide “additional security . . . 
to liberty, and to property.” THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 90 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987). It is also significant that the original state constitutions contained explicit 
protections for property rights as well. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights 
Movement, 404 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 7 (2001). 
 91.  James Madison, for one, argued that the very purpose of government was to protect 
private property and to “secure to every man, whatever is his own.” James Madison, Property, 
in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101, 102 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1906) (1792). 
 92.  See generally PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 85–86 (1993) (“In the first half of the [Twentieth] century, 
hunting and fishing organizations were the most political effective environmental activists.”). 
 93.  See FRANK GRAHAM, JR., THE AUDUBON ARK 12 (1990) (noting early efforts focused 
on “articulate persuasion” and “education”). 
 94.  See id. at 44 (discussing efforts to purchase Pelican Island in 1898). 
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environmental resources.95 Even Aldo Leopold, whose “land ethic” 
continues to inspire conservationists and ecologists to this day, 
suggested that property-based conservation strategies were more 
effective than regulation.96 
Some contemporary environmental thinkers have recognized the 
potential of property rights to advance environmental values, but this 
insight has rarely influenced public policy. As noted above, Hardin 
identified private property as a means to prevent the tragedy of the 
commons in his seminal essay on the subject.97 Wendell Berry, though 
not a proponent of classical liberal values or free market capitalism, 
nonetheless recognized that “the best conserver of land in use will 
always be the small owner or operator, farmer or forester or both, 
who lives within a securely placed family and community, who knows 
how to use the land in the best way, and who can afford to do so.”98 
He similarly counseled that “a large population of small property 
holders” offers the best hope for good stewardship of the land.99 
Where property rights are secure, owners are able to invest in 
conservation and have the incentive to do so.100 For this reason, it 
should be unsurprising that well-defined and secure property rights 
correlate with positive environmental results. Cross-country 
 
 95. See generally Robert J. Smith, Private Conservation Case Studies: Hawk Mountain 
Sanctuary Association, CTR. FOR PRIVATE CONSERVATION (Mar. 31, 1999), available at 
http://cei.org/studies-issue-analysis/hawk-mountain-sanctuary-association; STEFAN BECHTEL, 
MR. HORNADAY’S WAR: HOW A PECULIAR VICTORIAN ZOOKEEPER WAGED A LONELY 
CRUSADE FOR WILDLIFE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2012). 
 96.  See ALDO LEOPOLD, CONSERVATION ECONOMICS (1934), reprinted in THE RIVER OF 
THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS, at 193–94 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott 
eds., 1991) (“We tried to get conservation by buying land, by subsidizing desirable changes in 
land use, and by passing restrictive laws. The last method largely failed; the other two have 
produced some small samples of success.”). Leopold further suggested that private conservation 
was preferable to government acquisition of land for conservation purposes. Id. at 196. (“I do 
challenge the growing assumption that bigger buying [of public land] is a substitute for private 
conservation practice.”). 
 97.  See supra text accompany notes 23–48. 
 98.  See WENDELL BERRY, Private Property and the Common Wealth, in ANOTHER TURN 
OF THE CRANK 59 (1995). It is important to note, however, that Berry does not endorse a 
classical liberal conception of property. See Nathaniel Stewart, The Tragedy of the 
Commonwealth and the Vision of Wendell Berry, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 506 (2006). 
 99.  BERRY, supra note 98, at 49. 
 100.  See Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property: The Empirical Evidence, in 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 90, 108–09 (Terry L. Anderson & 
Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003); Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by 
Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439, 456 (1981) (“Wherever we have 
exclusive private ownership, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit 
undertaking, there are incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource.”). 
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comparisons find that “environmental quality and economic growth 
rates are greater in regimes where property rights are well defined 
than in regimes where property rights are poorly defined.”101 As a 
general matter, those natural resources subject to property 
institutions are managed more sustainably and in better condition 
than those subject to political management or left in open-access 
commons. 
The benefits of property rights at promoting both economic 
efficiency and environmental stewardship can be seen in the context 
of fisheries. For decades, fishery economists have argued that the 
creation of property rights in ocean fisheries, such as through the 
recognition of “catch-shares,”102 would eliminate the tragedy of the 
commons and avoid the pathologies of traditional fishery 
regulation.103 The imposition of limits on entry, gear, total catches, or 
fishing seasons has not proven particularly effective.104 Property-based 
management systems, on the other hand, have been shown to increase 
the efficiency and sustainability of the fisheries by aligning the 
interests of fishers with the underlying resource.105 A recent study in 
Science, for example, looked at over 11,000 fisheries over a fifty-year 
period and found clear evidence that the adoption of property-based 
management regimes prevents fishery collapse.106 Other research has 
confirmed both the economic and ecological benefits of property-
based fishery management.107 
 
 101.  Norton, supra note 82, at 51. 
 102.  A “catch share” is defined by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
as “a general term for several fishery management strategies that allocate a specific portion of 
the total allowable fishery catch to individuals, cooperatives, communities, and other entities. 
Each recipient of a catch share is directly accountable to stop fishing when its exclusive 
allocation is reached.” NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA CATCH SHARE 
POLICY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010) available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/ 
catchshare/docs/noaa_cs_policy.pdf. 
 103. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 30; Scott, supra note 30. 
 104. See Dietmar Grimm et al., Assessing Catch Shares’ Effects Evidence from Federal 
United States and Associated British Columbian Fisheries, 36 MARINE POL’Y 644, 647–48 (2012) 
(noting the environmental, economic, and social harms that result under traditional 
management and the race for fish); J.R. Beddington, D.J. Agnew & C.W. Clark, Current 
Problems in the Management of Marine Fisheries, 316 SCI. 1713, 1714 (2007) (discussing failings 
of traditional fishery regulations). 
 105.  See Christopher Costello, Steven D. Gaines & John Lynham, Can Catch Shares 
Prevent Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCI. 1678, 1679 (2008). 
 106.  Id. at 1680. 
 107.  See, e.g., Grimm et al., supra note 104, at 648 (“Catch shares management ends the 
race for fish by creating incentives for economic efficiency and long-term stewardship.”); Trevor 
A. Branch, How Do Individual Transferable Quotas Affect Marine Ecosystems?, 10 FISH & 
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The recognition of property rights in marine resources can also 
make it easier to adopt additional conservation measures. For 
instance, the adoption of catch-shares can reduce the incremental 
burden from the imposition of by-catch limits or the creation of 
marine reserves. A shift to catch-shares would have fiscal benefits as 
well.108 Yet in recent years, the greatest opposition to the adoption of 
such property-based management regimes has not come from 
progressive environmentalist groups, but from Republicans in 
Congress.109 
As the experience with fisheries shows, efforts to expand 
property rights to natural resources can produce positive 
environmental effects. To maximize the potential of property rights to 
enhance environmental protection, however, the property rights must 
be secure.110 Failing to respect and protect property rights can 
undermine environmental stewardship, particularly on private land. 
This is especially important in a country like the United States, in 
which a majority of land is privately owned.111 This problem is most 
evident in the context of endangered species. A majority of those 
species listed as endangered or threatened rely on private land for 
some or all of their habitat.112 If these species are not saved on private 
 
FISHERIES 39, 52 (2009) (“There are many positive ecological benefits of [individual 
transferable quotas]. Primarily, they encourage stewardship towards the resource by linking the 
value of quota shares to the future stream of income from the fishery.”); Ray Hilborn, 
Managing Fisheries is Managing People: What Has Been Learned?, 8 FISH & FISHERIES 285, 294 
(2007) (“Strong, well-funded single agencies are able to achieve biological sustainability when 
given a clear mandate. Economic success is more difficult to achieve, but appears to be rare in 
the absence of incentives that eliminate the race to fish.”). For a summary of this and other 
recent research documenting the economic and environmental benefits of property-based 
fishery management regimes, see Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Learning How to 
Fish: Catch Shares and the Future of Fishery Conservation, UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2013). 
 108.  See generally Dietmar Grimm, Judd Boomhower & Jason Blau, Can Catch Shares 
Reduce the US Federal Deficit? 3 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 118 (2010). 
 109. See Fish Stocks: Plenty More Fish In the Sea, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2012, at 32; 
Editorial, The Grand Old Party and the Sea, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2012, at A26. 
 110.  See, e.g., Ragnar Arnason, Property Rights in Fisheries: How Much Can Individual 
Transferable Quotas Accomplish?, 6 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 217, 227 (2012) (reducing 
property rights quality of catch shares reduces their efficiency); Corbett A. Grainger & 
Christopher Costello, The Value of Secure Property Rights: Evidence From Global Fisheries, 4 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17019, 2011) (noting quality of property 
rights affects behavior). 
 111.  RUBEN N. LUBOWSKI ET AL., MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, V 
(2006) (noting that over sixty percent of U.S. land is privately owned). 
 112.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-16, ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 4 (1994). See also 
David S. Wilcove & Joon Lee, Using Economic and Regulatory Incentives to Restore 
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land, they may not be saved at all. Yet the Endangered Species Act in 
effect punishes private landowners for having maintained their land 
in a way that is beneficial for listed species.113 This is because the 
presence of a listed species on private land results in the imposition of 
regulatory controls on private land-use—controls that are unwelcome 
even to conservation-minded landowners.114 The end result, as 
empirical research has shown, is a decline in endangered species 
habitat on private land.115 Greater protection of property rights could 
actually enhance species conservation.116  
D. Make the Polluter Pay 
Conservatives have traditionally emphasized the importance of 
personal responsibility.117 This principle is no less important in 
environmental policy than it is in other contexts. Individuals and 
corporations alike should be held responsible for the environmental 
harms that they cause. In short, polluters should pay for the 
consequences of their polluting activities. At the same time, neither 
should be subject to prescriptive regulations due to the bad actions of 
others. Broad drift-net-style regulatory edicts that impose burdens or 
mandates on large sectors of the economy may be easy to administer, 
but they are not a particularly efficient or equitable means of 
controlling pollution. A small number of individuals or firms may well 
be responsible for a disproportionate share of emissions or 
 
Endangered Species: Lessons Learned from Three New Programs, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
639, 640 (2004) (noting that an estimate that “private lands harbor at least one population of 
two-thirds of all federally listed species . . . is almost certainly an underestimate”). 
 113.  For a discussion of this point, see Adler, supra note 36, at 303–04 and the sources cited 
therein; see also Richard L. Stroup, The Economics of Compensating Property Owners, 15 
CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 55 (Oct. 1997). 
 114.  Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. &. ECON. 27, 28–29 (2003); see also Adler, supra note 36. 
 115.  See, e.g., Lueck & Michael, supra note 114.; Daowei Zhang, Endangered Species and 
Timber Harvesting: The Case of Red-Cockaded Woodpeckers, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 150 (2004); 
Amara Brook, Michaela Zint & Raymond De Young, Landowners’ Responses to an 
Endangered Species Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (2003). For additional anecdotal accounts, see Adler, supra 
note 36, at 319–25. 
 116.  For various proposals on how to encourage species conservation while engendering 
less conflict with landowners, see generally REBUILDING THE ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2011). 
 117.  ROGER SCRUTON, HOW TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE PLANET: THE CASE FOR 
AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATISM 70 (2012) (noting it is “a fundamental moral idea to 
which conservatives attach great importance: the idea that those responsible for damage should 
also repair it”). 
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environmental harms, and environmental policies should be designed 
accordingly.118 Wherever possible, environmental regulatory efforts 
should focus on controlling or sanctioning those who cause actual 
environmental harm. 
In many respects, the principle of making the polluter pay is 
merely an extension of the protection of private property rights. For 
centuries it has been well understood that an individual landowner’s 
right to make productive use of her property does not entail the right 
to prevent her neighbors from doing likewise. This principle is the 
foundation of the common law doctrine of nuisance.119 Where the 
deposit of waste or residuals onto private property is consented to by 
the owner and the physical effects of such disposal are contained on 
the property, there may be ecological harm, but no pollution.120 Thus 
pollution control can be understood as preventing the forcible 
imposition of a waste or emission by one person onto the person or 
property of another.  Waste itself is not pollution. 
While common law doctrines embody a polluter pays principle, 
there is ample reason to suspect the common law alone is not capable 
of addressing many modern pollution concerns, at least not without 
substantial reforms.121 Nonetheless, common law principles could 
inform regulatory policy to a far greater extent than they do today.122 
Under current law, for example, individuals may file citizen suits 
against firms for violating the terms of pollution permits, even where 
 
 118.  See J.G. Calvert, J.B. Heywood, R.F. Sawyer & J.H. Seinfeld, Achieving Acceptable 
Air Quality: Some Reflections on Controlling Vehicle Emissions, 261 SCI. 37, 40 (1993) (noting 
that an estimated ten percent of vehicles may be responsible for fifty percent of carbon 
monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions). 
 119.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, The Common Law and the Environment: The 
Canadian Experience, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 88–89 (Peter J. Hill & Rojer E. 
Meiners eds., 1998) (discussing nuisance law as a means of controlling pollution); see also Julian 
Morris, Climbing out of the Hole: Sunsets Subjective Value, the Environment, and the English 
Common Law, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 343 (2003); ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE DEFENSE OF NATURE (1995). 
 120.  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 277 (1995) 
(asserting that “self-pollution may be a harm, but it is not a tort”). 
 121.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Common Law a Free-Market Solution to Pollution?, 24 
CRITICAL REV. 61, 63 (2012); cf. SCRUTON, supra note 117, at 158–59 (“Tort-law reform would 
restore a corrective device on which the market economy depends, by preventing wrongdoers 
and exploiters from exporting their costs. The EPA’s regulatory regime, by contrast, both 
enhances the costs and transfers them all to us, in the form of increased prices.”). 
 122.  See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and 
Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39 (2001) (arguing that property 
rights, not liberalized standing rules, will encourage increased protection of environmental 
resources). 
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there is no evidence of environmental or other harm.123 At the same 
time, compliance with permit terms may shield polluting firms from 
liability or displace common law remedies.124 This is backwards. 
The principle that polluters should pay for their own pollution 
should also influence tax policy. Conservatives have long argued that 
it is preferable to tax consumption, rather than income or wealth 
creation.125 For this reason, some have floated the idea of a tax swap, 
replacing income or wage taxes with taxes on consumption or, given 
concerns about global climate change, taxes on carbon.126 Specifically, 
the federal government should impose a price on carbon that is fully 
rebated to taxpayers on a per capita basis. This would, in effect, shift 
the incidence of federal taxes away from income and labor and onto 
energy consumption and would offset some of the potential 
regressivity of a carbon tax. 
For those conservatives who have long supported shifting from 
an income tax to a sales or consumption tax and oppose increasing 
the federal tax burden, this should be a no brainer.127 If fully rebated, 
there is no need to worry about whether the government will put the 
resulting revenues to good use, but the tax would provide a significant 
incentive to reduce carbon energy use. In theory, there is not much 
difference between a pollution tax and a tradable emission credit 
regime. This is because a supply limitation can operate as a tax, and 
 
 123.  See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) 
(“The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury to the environment 
but injury to the plaintiff. To insist upon the former rather than the latter as part of the standing 
inquiry . . . is to raise the standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success on the 
merits in an action alleging noncompliance with an NPDES permit.”). 
 124. See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel., Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 309 (2010) 
(industrial emissions “expressly permitted by the states in which they are located” are not public 
nuisances). It is also well-established that federal environmental regulatory statutes displace 
federal common law remedies for interstate pollution. See, e.g., American Elec. Power Co., Inc. 
v. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011) (Clean Air Act displaces federal common law nuisance 
claims for interstate air pollution); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Clean Water Act 
displaces federal common law nuisance claims for interstate water pollution). 
 125.  See, e.g., NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER WITH ROB WOODALL, FAIRTAX: THE 
TRUTH (2008) (arguing that the income tax should be replaced with a national retail sales tax); 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Case for the ‘FairTax,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2005, at A18. 
 126.  See, e.g., Bob Inglis & Arthur B. Laffer, Op-Ed., An Emissions Plan Conservatives 
Could Warm To, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at WK10; James Hansen, Cap and Fade, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, at A29; see also  George P. Shultz & Gary S. Becker, Why We Support a 
Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax, WALL ST. J., APR. 7, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424127887323611604578396401965799658.html. 
 127. Shi-Ling Hsu & Yoram Bauman, Ten Reasons, 30 ENVTL F. 26 (2013). For a more 
comprehensive treatment, see SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST 
OUR HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011). 
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vice-versa. In practice, however, the two programs are not equivalent. 
Among other things, policy makers lack the necessary information to 
know what tax level would be equivalent to what supply constraint, 
but this is hardly the only difference. 
There are also reasons to suspect that such a tax would be less 
vulnerable to special-interest manipulation and capture, on the 
margin, than available alternatives, such as emissions cap-and-trade 
programs. Implementation of a cap-and-trade regime requires many 
more decisions about regulatory design than a tax regime, and each 
decision presents the opportunity for rent-seeking behavior.128 While a 
tax can be designed to be relatively uniform, implementing a trading 
scheme necessarily requires many decisions about how to allocate and 
value allowances. Users of allowances are not the only ones with 
something to gain through rent-seeking—those who seek to trade or 
broker allowances can also capture rents by influencing program 
design. 
E. Decentralize Decision-making 
Though some environmental problems, such as climate change, 
are truly global in scope, most environmental problems are local or 
regional in nature. Few, if any, environmental concerns could truly be 
described as “national,” save perhaps for the preservation of national 
treasures. Yet the lion’s share of environmental policy is directed—
albeit not implemented—in Washington, D.C. Truly local matters, 
such as the proper level of localized air pollutants or the extent to 
which a given water system should control for given contaminants in 
drinking water supplies, are treated as questions of federal law. At 
the same time, the federal government has largely abandoned many 
environmental responsibilities that clearly belong on the federal 
government’s plate.129 
There are many reasons environmental protection efforts would 
benefit from greater decentralization. First, as already noted, most 
environmental problems are local or regional in nature, and do not 
involve the sort of interjurisdictional spillovers that would justify 
federal intervention. Environmental policy questions also tend to 
involve difficult trade-offs between competing economic, ethical, and 
 
 128.  See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate 
Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade,  28 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 37–39 (2009) (explaining why a tradable emission permit regime is 
inherently more complex than an equivalent carbon tax regime). 
 129.  See Adler, supra note 121, at 160. 
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aesthetic values—values that may vary from place-to-place. There is 
no reason to expect every corner of the country to share precisely the 
same environmental priorities. At the same time, environmental 
conditions are incredibly variable across the country. Even where 
regions suffer from the same environmental concern, such as 
tropospheric ozone pollution (known as “smog”), the particular 
causes and contributions will vary, necessitating variable policy 
responses. Yet the information necessary to address such concerns is 
most readily available at the local level. One-size-fits-all policy 
approaches too easily become one-size-fits nobody.130 
Decentralizing environmental decision-making also creates the 
opportunity for greater innovation in environmental policy. State 
efforts at environmental protection long predate federal 
environmental regulations and many federal programs were spurred 
by, or modeled after, preexisting state programs.131 The best way to 
address a given environmental concern may be difficult, which is even 
more reason to allow different jurisdictions to experiment with 
different approaches. Such interjurisdictional competition does not 
produce a “race to the bottom” or prevent states from adopting 
environmental measures.132 To the contrary, empirical research has 
shown that states seek to address those environmental concerns 
important to their citizens when they can and are quick to learn about 
and replicate the successful policy experiments of their neighbors.133 
 
 130. See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1996) (“Federal regulators never have been and never will be 
able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal 
regulatory judgments that reflect the technical requirements of particular locations and 
pollution sources.”). 
 131.  See supra notes 49–69 and accompanying text. 
 132. See, e.g., John A. List & Shelby Gerking, Regulatory Federalism and Environmental 
Protection in the United States, 40 J. REGIONAL SCI. 453 (2000); Daniel L. Millimet & John A. 
List, A Natural Experiment on the ‘Race to the Bottom’ Hypothesis: Testing for Stochastic 
Dominance in Temporal Pollution Trends, 65 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 395 (2003); 
Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact of Environmental Federalism, 43 J. 
REGIONAL SCI. 711 (2003); see also Adler, supra note 66, at 47–53 (showing the pattern of state 
wetland regulation is contrary to what a race-to-the-bottom hypothesis would predict). 
 133. See, e.g., PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 180–81 (2004) (finding states are 
more likely to increase, rather than decrease, air quality regulation in response to actions taken 
in neighboring states, and concluding that “the race to the bottom is not a factor here”); id. at 
191–92 (finding no “race to the bottom” in groundwater regulation); Wallace E. Oates, A 
Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 1, 15 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002) (“States appear to be ‘pulled’ to 
higher levels of abatement spending by more stringent measures in neighboring states, but 
relatively lax regulations nearby appear to have no effect on such expenditures.”); see also 
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 
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Decentralizing much environmental policymaking would also 
have the added benefit of making it easier for the federal government 
to focus its efforts on those environmental concerns where a federal 
role is easiest to justify, such as in supporting scientific research and 
addressing interstate spillovers.134 Thanks to the Supreme Court,135 the 
EPA will have its hands full dealing with greenhouse gas emissions in 
a futile effort to forestall the effects of global climate change.136 
Allowing state and local governments to exercise more control over 
more localized concerns would make it easier for the EPA to focus on 
this task. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In How to Think Seriously about the Planet: The Case for an 
Environmental Conservatism, British philosopher Roger Scruton 
observes that “conservatism and conservation are two aspects of a 
single long-term policy, which is that of husbanding resources and 
ensuring their renewal.”137 The cause of environmental conservation 
also has deep roots in American history, and is tied in with the 
American tradition of land ownership and the protection of private 
property. It is thus dispiriting and distressing to see contemporary 
conservative politicians turn their backs on environmental concerns. 
Conservatives need to recognize that the goal of environmental 
protection is quite compatible with conservative principles of 
governance. Recognizing the reality of environmental problems does 
not require abandoning a commitment to limited government, free 
enterprise, or constitutional constraints. Embracing environmental 
protection does not require embracing the Environmental Protection 
Agency. Yet until conservatives are willing to articulate an 
environmental vision, they will cede the ground to those on their 
left—and there is no greater way to ensure that environmental policy 
will embody the sorts of governmental interventions and controls that 
conservatives so detest. 
 
 
HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001) (presenting empirical data that challenges the view that states are 
ineffective environmental regulators). 
 134. See Adler, supra note 22, at 157–69. 
 135.  Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 136.  See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 421 
(2011). 
 137.  SCRUTON, supra note 94, at 9. 
